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 1. Introduction  
Pension schemes may be unfunded or funded. In an unfunded pay-as-you-go scheme, the 
pension represents a transfer made between the current working population to the current 
retired population. In a funded scheme the working population make contributions into a 
pension fund which, during the accumulation phase, grows in value up to retirement. After 
retirement, the fund enters the decumulation phase and pays out a pension to the retired 
pensioners for the remainder of their lives. The management of investment funds in these 
pension schemes is the topic of this paper. 
 
During the accumulation phase, the pension fund will tend to increase in value because of 
additional contributions made into the fund, and also due to the investment returns generated 
by the assets in the fund.  For example, in a pension scheme that requires annual 
contributions of $1,000 over 40 years, the fund’s assets will build up to $120,800 in value at 
retirement if the return on cumulated funds was 5% per year; but the same contributions over 
the same period if the rate of return was 6% would grow to $154,800. This simple numerical 
example illustrates that small changes in the return on assets can have a dramatic impact on 
the size of the pension fund at retirement, and hence on the pension that ca be paid from this 
accumulated fund. In practice the returns on pension fund investments will vary every period, 
hence introducing some risk into the size of the pension fund at retirement, and types of 
pension schemes differ according to who bears this investment risk.  
 
Private pension schemes can be classified by type in two dimensions: whether the pension is 
paid on a defined contribution or a defined benefit basis, and whether the pension scheme is 
constituted on an individual or a group basis. Individual pension schemes are always funded 
and pay a pension at retirement on a defined contribution basis. This means that the 
individual receives a pension which depends on the accumulated assets in the fund. Personal 
pensions in the UK and 401(k) pension plans or individual retirement accounts in the US are 
examples of such schemes, and individuals may have some choice over the type of 
investments in the fund. Under any defined contribution scheme, the pensioner bears the risk 
of fund underperformance. Group pension schemes are arranged for more than one 
individual, and there may be some sharing across generations of the accumulated assets in 
the pension fund. In most countries occupational schemes provided by an employer are 
examples of group pension schemes, and may pay on a defined benefit or a defined 
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contribution basis. Papke, Petersen and Poterba (1993) note the shift in the US from defined 
benefit to defined contribution pension schemes and particularly 401(k) plans. Similarly in 
the UK there has been a substantial growth in UK individual defined contribution schemes 
over the last twenty years. According to the Sandler Report (2002) between 1988 and 1995 
the share of total pensions assets represented by personal pensions increased from 12 to over 
20 per cent. 
 
The return earned by assets in the pension fund depends upon the investment strategy and 
asset allocation decisions of the pension fund. These investment decisions can be made by 
individual pension contributors, or delegated to professional fund managers. The purpose of 
this paper is to analyse the investment management process of funds invested in pension 
schemes. We will be particular interested in measuring the performance of investment returns 
earned by pension funds. Although we will consider investment performance within a global 
context, in fact only a small number of countries have sizeable funded pension schemes. 
Table 1 shows the stock of pension assets for major developed countries in 1996. The US, 
UK and Netherlands have large amounts of pension fund assets relative to GDP in their 
economies, reflecting the importance of funded schemes in these countries.1 In contrast 
major economies such as Japan, France and Germany have a relatively small percentage of 
pension fund assets, reflecting the fact that these economies’ pension schemes are 
predominantly unfunded pay-as-you-go systems.  
 
In the next section we will discuss the investment management industry in general, and 
explain how it relates to the pensions management industry. Section 3 explains the 
measurement of investment returns, and section 4 introduces a number of risk-adjusted 
performance measures, and section 5 discusses some problems with these measures. Sections 
6 and 7 report the results of empirical evidence of pension fund investment performance. 
Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Description of Pensions Management Industry 
                                                 
1 Palacios and Pallares-Miralles (2000) identify these three countries plus Australia, South Africa, Switzerland and 
Iceland as being the only countries in the world with private pension fund assets being greater than 50 per cent of 
GDP. A combination of generous tax allowances on pension contributions [Dilnot and Johnson (1993)] and a liberal 
regulatory regime for pension investments  [Davis (1995)] probably explains the dominance of funded pensions in 
these countries. 
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Pension fund management is only one part of the very large global investment management 
industry, which represents the management of investment portfolios by professional fund 
managers.2 Such delegated portfolio management also includes unit trusts (mutual funds), 
investment trusts (closed-end funds), investment policies, (life assurance, endowment 
policies). Franks, Mayer and Da Silva (2003) report that it is estimated that the extent of 
global assets under external management during 1999 was of the order of €33 trillion. Table 
2 shows the assets under management in seven European countries and the United States. 
Franks et al report that in all of these countries the amount of assets managed has increased 
substantially throughout the nineteen nineties. In UK, USA, France, Germany, Netherlands 
over the period 1994-99 the amount of assets managed more than doubled; net assets of 
Spanish Institutional investors trebled over the same period; and assets under management in 
Italy in 1999 were six times greater than in 1994. Davis and Steil (2001) produce similar 
estimates, and suggest that the recent increase is part of a longer trend of institutionalization 
of the savings markets around the world. In 1970 the total financial claims of the financial 
sector was 4 per cent of GDP for the G-7 countries. By 1998 this figure had almost doubled 
to 7.91 per cent. 
 
In table 2, pension assets are a significant part of the global investment management 
industry: pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance funds account for roughly equal shares 
of total assets, though both mutual funds and insurance funds will include some pension 
savings . Pension funds are relatively important in the UK and the US, and we can see from 
Table 2 that in the US mutual funds are also important institutional investors, which is not 
the case for the UK. Table 3 shows the percentage of UK corporate equity owned by 
institutional investors, and shows that pension funds are major investors in the equity 
markets, owning about 40 per cent of the UK’s equity sector. Table 2 also shows, although 
France and Germany do not have large funded pension schemes, they have relatively large 
insurance and mutual fund sectors. It is important to recognize that individuals in different 
countries may be making provisions for their retirement through other savings vehicles. 
UCITS (Undertaking for collective investment in transferable securities) are important 
savings vehicles in France and Germany [Franks et al (2002)] 
 
                                                 
2 Investment management is also referred to as fund management, asset management, portfolio management and 
money management. 
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The difference between pension schemes and other saving vehicles, is the long-term nature of 
the scheme under which the savings cannot be accessed until retirement. Del Guercio and 
Tkac (2002) find that the flow of funds into pension funds are less sensitive to past 
performance, than for mutual funds and suggest that this is because on the long-term nature 
of pension schemes. 
 
A fund manager is an individual (or company) that performs a range of activities centred 
around a core service of investing clients’ assets, in particular managing an investment 
portfolio. The client-manager relationship is an example of the principal-agent framework 
where the client employs a fund manager to invest the client’s assets in order to maximise 
returns for a given level of risk or obtain the lowest level of risk to achieve a targeted return. 
In terms of mean-variance analysis the objective of the fund manger is to locate the client’s 
portfolio on the efficiency frontier or in the case of active fund management to generate 
abnormal returns above some benchmark ie to do better than the efficiency frontier. With 
respect to occupational pension funds Lakonishock, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) refer to a 
“double agency” problem, since the employee as principal, and who will eventually become 
the recipient of the pension, delegates pension fund decisions to the company who in turn 
delegates the investment allocation decisions to a fund manager.  
 
Why does the client delegate investment management to the fund manager? There are two 
reasons: First the fund manager may have superior investment skills, through information 
processing abilities. The second reason is due to economies of scale in the fund management 
process: buying and selling securities may be expensive for a small fund, and pooling these 
funds under the juristiction of a single fund manager may be efficient. Of course the 
disadvantage of delegated portfolio management, is that the client needs to monitor the fund 
manager. Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1984) and Stoughton (1993) discuss the structure of 
fund manager contracts within the context of delegated portfolio management. 
 
There are two basic types of delegated investment management:  bespoke and pooled fund 
management. In a bespoke vehicle the client hires a fund manager to make the investment 
decisions on its behalf according to some specified mandate and specific return expectation. 
The fund manager acts as the custodian of the investor’s capital, and will typically report 
back to the client in a personal capacity on a regular basis on the performance of the fund. In 
a pooled vehicle, the client simple purchases units of a diversified investment from a 
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financial institution such as an insurance company, or a unit trust, and this approach involves 
the commingling of investment capital from many clients. The fund manager will again 
report back to the client, but in a less personal manner. Not surprisingly the costs of running 
a bespoke service will be more than the pooled vehicle, and for that reason the bespoke 
vehicle is only likely to be used by clients with large amounts of funds to be managed. 
Typical fees charged by fund managers for managing a segregated fund across a nmber of 
countries is given in Table 4. The median fee for managing an equity portfolio is about 50 
basis points or 0.5 per cent  per year of the funds under management. 
 
The fund manager manages the client’s investment portfolio, with an appropriate mix of asset 
classes/ select assets, with the typical objective of maximizing returns subject to a specified 
level of risk, and will adjust the portfolio through time, as expectations of returns changes. 
Under pooled fund management, the fund manager sets the long-term policy of the fund, and 
then investors such as pension funds can choose to purchase shares in this investment 
vehicle. Under bespoke asset management, the fund manager will agree a long-term policy or 
strategy with the pension fund, that will involve specifying a relevant benchmark against 
which the portfolio performance will be judged. Traditionally fund managers were assessed 
by relation to a peer-group benchmark such as outperforming the median performance of 
similar funds. However Myners’ (2001) reports a long-run trend away from peer-group 
benchmark to customized benchmarks. This trend reflects trustees increasingly taking asset 
allocation decisions on the basis of advice from consultants, and then allocating management 
of a class of assets to a specific fund manager. The customized benchmark for that manager 
might then be the relevant index for that asset class. Bespoke investment management 
process is seen as dynamic, with the mandate evolving over time as the performance of the 
fund or asset class varies, and expectations of future returns change. 
 
Individual pension schemes that have delegated investment management will typically be 
constituted on a pooled basis, unless the individual is particularly wealthy. The type of fund 
management chosen for occupational pension schemes will depend in part on the advice 
given by consultant actuaries, who assess the financial viability of the occupational pension 
scheme. Under an insured scheme contributions are made into a pooled vehicle, which 
guarantees to pay a pre-defined benefit at a pre-defined time. The risk of a funding shortfall 
(ignoring default risk) is borne by the fund manager (typically an insurance company), and 
not the individual or the corporation. Most small schemes will be run as insured fund 
 
 6
management. Under a self-administered schemes, where the pension fund sponsors have 
some control over the investment management, fund management may be outsourced  to one 
or more external managers, or managed in-house. If the performance objectives are met, the 
pension scheme should meet all actuarially defined future liabilities. The risks of a 
contribution shortfall are thus borne by both the sponsoring company and by the external 
fund manager (to the extent that a failure to meet the benchmark will result in a loss of assets 
under management). A self-administered scheme may either opt to join a pooled investment 
fund, which typically offers a lower fee structure though no mandate flexibility. Alternatively 
the fund may be managed on a segregated basis, offering greater mandate flexibility but at a 
higher price. If the scheme is managed on a segregated basis, the pension fund employs one 
or more fund managers, who are given a mandate to manage assets against a pre-determined 
benchmark. This method may be discretionary, whereby the asset composition is left up to 
the fund manager, or non-discretionary, whereby the trustees decide upon the asset 
allocation. In the non-discretionary case the pension fund sponsors would typically rely on 
the advice of consultants (actuaries) on the appropriate asset allocation, and then employ 
specialist fund managers in different sectors. 
 
Very large pension schemes are typically managed by a team of in-house professionals. This 
allows the fund complete flexibility in terms of asset/liability matching. However the risk of 
a contribution shortfall lies solely with the scheme sponsor. Tonks (2005) reports on the 
distribution of fund managers (external and internal) across 2,175 UK occupational pension 
funds from 1984-97 in table 5, and provides evidence on the concentration of pension fund 
management.. The top ranked fund manager (1RMan) managers 10.8% of observations in the 
sample, the second ranked managers 5.6% and the third managers 4.8%, and another 14 fund 
managers (4RMan-18RMan) manage a total of 23.14% of observations. 1RMan manages 
across 244 funds, and 81.04% of these funds’ observations are using 1RMan. There is also a 
multi-manager category and a change of manager category (ΔMan). Most funds use a single 
fund manager in any quarter, but 659 funds have multiple fund managers at some time, and 
29.07% of all observations have multiple fund managers. Only 85 funds use the same fund 
manager over the fund’s life.  
 
There are a number of different fund management styles. The traditional mandate given to a 
fund manager is a balanced mandate under which the fund manager manages across all asset 
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classes, and then selects securities within each asset class. The asset allocation decision has a 
strategic component, in which the global mix of asset classes are considered based on long 
term expectations of expected returns and global macroeconomic factors. In the short term, 
fund managers may make tactical asset allocation decisions, moving away from the strategic 
asset allocation decision, to take advantage of short-term fluctuations in asset returns. 
 
Within each asset class a fund manager will make security selection decisions. This may 
involve active fund management, based on better information or better investment skills of 
the fund manager, in order to earn a return above the efficiency frontier. As distinct from 
balanced fund management, the pension fund may employ specialist managers or apply 
specialist mandates to specific sectors, having made the asset allocation decision separately. 
An alternative to active management is passive fund management, whereby the fund manager 
adopts a stock selection strategy that tracks the market portfolio an appropriate index. 
Pension funds may also employ specialist fund managers who apply quantitative investment 
management techniques, such as programme trading, or use hedge funds 
 
3. Return Calculation Methods and Benchmarks  
Investors such as pension funds who have delegated their portfolio to a portfolio manager 
will want to assess the portfolio’s performance in terms of its realized risk and returns 
characteristics. The return to a pension fund’s investments over a period (t,t+1), provided 
there are no net cash inflows into the pension fund during the period is defined as 
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where ri is the return on the pension fund over the period, divsi,t are the dividends received by 
the pension fund from its investments at the end of the period, mvi,t is the market value of the 
fund at time t. However suppose that there are  net inflows NIi,t  representing cash coming 
into the fund, though contributions, and cash going out in the form of pensions. A mature 
pension fund, with a high percentage of pensioners to active members, is likely to have 
negative net inflows. We need to allow for these cash flows in the return calculation, since 
they do not reflect the investment performance of the fund manager. 
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There are two methods for allowing for within-period cash-flows: time weighted return 
(TWR), and money weighted return (MWR). TWR calculates the return achieved from a 
time point immediately after each cash flow until the next cash flow and compounds the 
returns to get the total return. MWR treats the investment as a project with positive and 
negative cash flows, and calculate the internal rate of return (IRR) of these cash flows. The 
IRR is called the MWR when applied in this manner. In general TWR and MWR differ 
because TWR is a pure percentage return, taking no account of the size of the actual cash 
value on which the percentage is based; 
 
The CFA Institute (formerly the AIMR) has developed a comprehensive set of Global 
Investment Performance Standards (GIPS), in order to promote a common set of guidelines 
for portfolio performance measurement: and these standards recommend the use of TWR in 
performance calculations. Although there may be times when the portfolio assessment would 
like to take account of the amount of funds under management, in which case the MWR 
would be more appropriate. So the moral is that in calculating returns ensure that cash 
inflows and outflows are appropriately allowed for, and then either use TWR or MWR 
consistently to compute returns. 
 
Table 6 reports the average return on the median UK pension fund over the period 2994-2003 
as 6.1 per cent per annum. Part of the investment return will be due to movements on the 
stock market as a whole. In order to isolate the performance of the fund manager, the 
performance of the investment portfolio may be separated from the return on an appropriate 
benchmark portfolio. One candidate benchmark is a stock market index such as the S&P500, 
or the FTSE100. However this may be a poor proxy for the asset allocation of the whole 
pension fund, if the fund is invested in a variety of asset classes. Tables 7 and 8 illustrates the 
asset allocation of UK pension funds from 1993-2003, and of the pension funds of a number 
of major economies in 2003. Table 8 suggests that the asset allocation of pension funds is 
similar across countries: approximately 50 per cent in equities, 25 per cent in bonds, and the 
remainder in cash, property and other assets. There are some differences in the split between 
foreign and domestic equities and bonds, but table 7 shows how the median UK pension fund 
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has moved towards its recent asset allocation: a substantial reduction in UK equities, partially 
offset by an increase in overseas equities, and a substantial increase in bonds.  
 
Therefore in order to assess performance of the portfolio, we could use a market index 
appropriate to the particular asset class, such as in the second column of Table 6. However 
market indices still suffer from a number of problems. The sector market index may exhibit 
survivorship bias from assets that have been removed due to poor performance, so that 
returns on the index will be upward biased. It would not be possible to generate the returns 
on an index, by continuously replicating the exact asset composition of the index without 
incurring substantial trading costs. Bailey, Richards and Tierney (2001) point out that 
pension funds may hire fund managers with specific investment mandates which are related 
to the liabilities of the pension fund. The market index may not reflect the divergent style of 
the managers. Other alternative benchmarks are the median return of a sample fund managers 
in a similar asset class, or a normal portfolio. Bailey (1992) makes a number of criticisms of 
median managers including: the subjective selection of the sample; the different risks and 
styles between managers; the lack of transparency in such a benchmark and the difficulty in 
replicating the same investment strategy. Normal portfolios are customized benchmarks 
designed to reflect the style of an individual manager, but these may be difficult to 
implement, and are subject to manipulation from an underperforming fund manager. Blake 
(1998) and Blake and Timmermann (2002) suggest the use of liability-driven benchmarks. 
However this raises the issue of the valuation of pension liabilities, and it is unclear how to 
obtain the appropriate discount rate for valuing pension liabilities.3
 
4. Risk Adjusted Portfolio Performance Measurement Measures 
In making the comparison in terms of realised returns it is important to make an adjustment 
for the risk of the portfolio. What is the appropriate measure of risk? If the portfolio is the 
only portfolio held by the pension fund then the total risk of the portfolio would be the 
measure of risk. If the portfolio is held along with a number of other portfolios, then the non-
diversifiable risk of the portfolio will be the appropriate measure. 
 
(a) Sharpe Measure: Excess Return to Variability 
                                                 
3 Speed et al (2003) and Hill (2003) discuss the use of liability based benchmarks in the context of pension fund 
returns. 
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To assess the portfolio returns Sharpe (1966, 1994) proposed computing S for the portfolio 
under consideration and also for the benchmark portfolio. 
S = (rp - rf )/ σp
where rp is the return on the portfolio, rf is the risk-free rate and σp is the standard deviation 
of the returns on the portfolio. The Sharpe measure uses the Capital Market Line as a 
benchmark and is appropriate for a pension fund that has invested its wealth in the one 
portfolio under consideration. Lo (2002) has examined the properties of the Sharpe Ratio 
taking account of estimation risk. 
 
 (b) Excess Return to beta: Treynor Measure 
Treynor (1965) proposed using the Security Market Line as a benchmark and T is appropriate 
for funds that have invested their wealth in a number of portfolios. 
T = (rp - rf )/ βp
where βp is the beta of the portfolio. Again to assess the performance of a portfolio, T is 
computed for both the portfolio and a benchmark.  
 
(c) Jensen Differential Performance Index 
Jensen (1968) proposed measuring the performance of a portfolio by its abnormal return  
above the Security Market Line 
αp = rp - {rf + βp(Erm - rf)} 
where Erm is the expected return (sample average) on the market portfolio, and αp is the 
Jensen-α measure of out-performance. Alternatively we may regress the excess return (rp - rf) 
of a portfolio against the excess return on the market and interpret the intercept as the Jensen 
measure. The Jensen-α specifically evaluates the active fund management by the portfolio 
manager, as opposed to the passive fund management of investing in the risk-free asset and 
the market portfolio. 
 
Although bother the Treynor and Jensen measures are based on the Security Market Line, 
when comparing two portfolios, they can give conflicting assessments of performance. This 
is because the Treynor measure evaluates a portfolio based on the excess return per unit of 
risk, measured by the portfolio beta. In contrast the Jensen-alpha measures the absolute 
excess return for the level of risk adopted by the portfolio. These three measures of portfolio 
performance can be interpreted as investment returns, in the following was. The Sharpe 
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measure S shows the return per unit of volatility to the zero investment portfolio formed by 
borrowing $1 and investing it in the portfolio. The Treynor measure T shows the return per 
unit of beta-risk to the zero investment portfolio formed by borrowing $1 and investing it in 
the portfolio. The Jensen-alpha shows the return earned by the zero investment portfolio 
formed by selling short βP dollars in the market portfolio and (1-βP) dollars in the risk free 
asset and investing $1 in the portfolio 
 
The Jensen-α measure has the advantage that it can easily be extended to alternative asset 
pricing models, such as the Arbitrage Pricing Theory. The multi-factor Jensen-α with n-
factors can be written as 
αp = rp - rf  -bp1F1 - bp2F2 - . . . .- bpnFn
where Fk is the risk premium on the nth factor. 
 
d) Information Ratio 
The information ratio is similar to the Sharpe Ratio but compares the performance of a 
portfolio to its benchmark 
I  = (rp – rb )/ σER
Where rp  is the average return for portfolio p over some period, rb  is the average return on a 
benchmark portfolio over the same period, so that (rp – rb ) is the excess return on the 
portfolio over the benchmark; σER  is called the tracking error, and is the standard deviation 
of the excess returns during the period. The Information Ratio compares the return over the 
benchmark with the ‘risk’ taken - where risk is the tracking error, defined as the deviation 
from benchmark 
 
5. Problems with Performance Measurement 
a) The Market Index 
A potential problem with the risk-adjusted performance measures outlined above, is that the 
benchmark used for comparison may be inappropriate. For example it is an unresolved 
question whether the CAPM is the correct asset pricing model that can explain the cross-
sectional distribution of asset prices in an economy [Fama and French (1996)]. Even if the 
correct asset pricing model is specified, Roll (1978) points out that the chosen index may not 
represent the entire universe of securities: in fact it is likely that equity indices such as the 
S&P 500 will have a large capitalization bias. In this case the performance measure may be 
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comparing the performance of the fund with a benchmark that itself is inefficient. Grinblatt 
and Titman (1993) suggest a method of assessing portfolio performance without requiring a 
benchmark, this involves comparing the performance of the selected assets in the portfolio, 
with a reference period when these same assets were not in the portfolio. 
 
b) Market Timing 
The original Jensen technique made no allowance for market timing abilities of fund 
managers when fund managers change the composition of their portfoilio on the basis of 
expected market movements. When portfolio managers expect the market portfolio to rise in 
value, they may switch from bonds into equities and/or they may invest in more high beta 
stocks. When they expect the market to fall they will undertake the reverse strategy: sell high 
beta stocks and move into “defensive” stocks. If managers successfully engage in market 
timing then, returns to the fund will be high when the market is high, and also relatively high 
when the market is low 
 
If there was no market timing then a regression of  ri -rf  against rm- rf  would produce points 
scattered around the solid line in figure 1. If there is market timing, then the correct model 
specification, should be a different dotted line in the good and bad market conditions. A 
simple Jensen-alpha intercept will conclude that there is negative performance. If managers 
successfully market time, then a quadratic plot would prove a better fit (Treynor-Mazuy test). 
So a test of market timing is a significant value of γp in the following regression, for the 
single factor model 
Rpt - rf  = αp +  βp(Rmt -rf) + γp (Rmt - rf)2  +  εpt
An alternative test of market timing for the single factor model suggested by Merton-
Henriksson is 
Rpt - rf  = αp +  βp(Rmt -rf) + δp(Rmt - rf)+  +  ηpt
 where (Rmt - rf )+  = Max(0, Rmt -rf ). The market timing test is easily extended to a multi-
factor framework, assessing the timing on each of the style components.  
 
d) Conditional Performance Evaluation 
In order to distinguish fund managers’ skills from simply taking advantage of predictable 
market or factor movements, Ferson and Schadt (1996) advocate allowing for the benchmark 
 
 13
parameters to be conditioned on economic conditions. Allowing the market parameters to be 
time-varying, the Jensen regression becomes 
Rit - rft =  αi + βi(Zt-1) (Rmt - rft) + γiFt +  εit
where Zt-1 is a vector of instruments for the information available at time t (and is therefore 
specified as t-1)  and βi(Zt) are time conditional betas, and their functional form is specified 
as linear 
βi(Zt) = b0 + B’zt-1
where zt-1 = Zt-1 - E(Z) is a vector of deviations of the Zs from their unconditional means. 
Implementing this approach involves creating interaction terms between the market returns 
and the instruments. Typical instruments used are: lagged treasury bill rate, dividend yield, 
default premium (difference between low and high quality corporate bonds), slope of the 
term structure (difference between long and short run government bond yields).  
 
d) Style-adjusted performance 
The benchmark portfolio can be a single index or because investment style is important, a 
‘customised’ benchmark can be developed specifically for the portfolio in question [Daniel et 
al (1997)].  For example, if the portfolio holds on average 20% US government bonds, 80% 
US equities, we may form a customised benchmark as 0.8 x S&P500 + 0.2 x Merrill Lynch 
Government Bond Index. Usually the customised benchmark is based on an effective mix 
style analysis [Sharpe (1992)]. This is achieved by performing an ‘effective mix’ style 
analysis on the fund and finding the style exposures. For example, suppose a regression is 
run on the portfolio returns against various factors, and suppose the following factor-loadings 
are estimated: 0.4 for large value stock portfolio; 0.2 for growth stock portfolio; 0.3 for small 
cap portfolio; and 0.1 for government bond. Then we can form a customised benchmark for 
the fund as 0.4*Large + 0.2*growth + 0.3*Small cap + 0.1*Bonds 
 
6. Evidence on Investment Performance 
 The early evidence on the performance of mutual funds in the US found that simple tests of 
abnormal performance did not yield significant returns. Jensen (1968) examined the 
performance of 115 mutual funds over the period 1955-1964, using the Security Market Line 
as the basis for a comparison. Jensen’s technique is to regress the excess returns on the 
individual fund (above the risk free rate), against the excess return on the market (Rmt - rft) 
Rit - rft =  αi + βi (Rmt - rft) +  εit
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for each fund i  over the t data periods, and save the coefficients αi and βi. Under the null 
hypothesis of no-abnormal performance the α coefficient should be equal to zero. For each 
fund we may test the significance of α as a measure of that funds abnormal performance. In 
addition we may test for overall fund performance, by testing the significance of the mean α. 
α α−
=
= ∑1
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The appropriate t-statistic is 
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i
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α( )  
He then examines the abnormal return for each fund net of expenses. Jensen found that the 
average abnormal return across funds was approx -1% per annum: if expenses were added 
back into the gross return, average abnormal return was approx. zero. Hence Jensen’s 
conclusions were that market professionals do not appear to be able to beat the market.  
 
Applying this same methodology to the average performance of pension funds, Ippolito and 
Turner (1987) examined returns on 1,526 US pension funds and find underperformance 
relative to the  S&P500 Index. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishney (1992) provide evidence on 
the structure and performance of the Money Management Industry in the US in general, but 
focus on the role of pension funds, examining 769 pension funds, with total assets of $129 
billion at the end  of 1989. They find the equity performance of funds under-performed the 
S&P 500 by 1.3% per year throughout the eighties. They emphasise that although there is a 
long literature on the under-performance of mutual funds, pension funds also under-perform 
relative to mutual funds on average. Coggin, Fabozzi and Rahman (1993) investigate the 
investment performance of a random sample of 71 US equity pension fund managers for the 
period January 1983 through December 1990, and find that the average selectivity measure is 
positive and average timing ability is negative.  Though both selectivity and timing are 
sensitive to the choice of benchmark when management style is taken into consideration. For 
example they find that funds that target value strategies yielded outperformance of 2.1 per 
cent per annum, but funds that adopted growth strategies underperformed by -0.96 per cent. 
 
In the UK Blake, Lehmann, & Timmermann, (1999) examine the asset allocations of a 
sample of 364 UK pension funds who retained the same fund manager over the period 1986-
1994. They find that the total return is dominated by asset allocation. Average return from 
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stock selection is negative, and average return to market timing very negative. In one asset 
class, UK equity managers are comparatively good at selecting equities, but only 16% of 
sample beat peer group average. Thomas and Tonks (2001) investigate the performance of 
the UK equity portfolios of 2,175 segregated UK pension funds over the period 1984-97, and 
the results are presented in Table 9. They find that over the whole period and across all funds 
average outperformance was not very different from zero, and there were negative return to 
market timing, though the significance of selectivity increased with the addition of the 
market timing variable. The distribution of the Jensen-alphas across funds is given in figure 
2.  Gregory and Tonks (2004) examine the performance of individual personal pensions 
(exempt unit trusts) in the UK 1980-2000. They examine those personal pension schemes 
that invest predominantly in UK equities, and in table 10 report that average performance is 
not significantly different from zero.  
 
7. Persistence in Investment Performance 
Although on average fund managers do not outperform, in any sample there is a distribution 
to the performance as in figure 1, and more recently research on performance measurement 
has investigated whether the outperformers in the sample continue to outperform in the 
future. Grinblatt and Titman (1992) find that differences in mutual fund performance 
between funds persist over 5-year time horizons and this persistence is consistent with the 
ability of fund managers to earn abnormal returns. Carhart (1997) demonstrates that common 
factors in stock returns (including a momentum factor) and investment expenses explain 
persistence in equity mutual funds’ mean and risk-adjusted returns.  The only significant 
persistence not explained, is concentrated in strong underperformance by the worst return 
mutual funds.  His results do not support the existence of skilled or informed mutual fund 
portfolio managers. There are a number of tests for persistence, and recently Carpenter and 
Lynch (1999) have assessed the power of these difference tests particularly in the presence of 
different types of survivorship bias. Carpenter and Lynch classify persistence tests into two 
types: performance ranked portfolio strategies, and contingency tables.  
 
Performance ranked portfolio tests sort fund manager each year into portfolios based on past 
performance, and then form portfolios of the top and bottom managers (by decile or quintile). 
The equally weighted average portfolio abnormal return of the top and bottom portfolios over 
the subsequent evaluation period is then evaluated. These procedures are followed for 
overlapping periods throughout the full period of the dataset, and the difference between the 
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average abnormal return on the series of top and bottom portfolios are computed.  From their 
simulations Carpenter and Lynch find that the persistence test based on a t-statistic of the 
difference between the performance of the top and bottom portfolio managers is the best 
specified under the hypothesis of no persistence, and the most powerful against the 
alternatives considered. These persistence tests can be computed on the basis of alternative 
ranking and evaluation time periods, since it may be the case that persistency is only apparent 
at particular time intervals.  
 
Contingency tables classify funds as winners or losers in each of two consecutive time 
periods, and examines the distribution of winner-loser combinations. Lakonishok et al 
(1992) in their study of 769 all equity pension funds, undertakes a contingency analysis 
with funds divided into quartiles, and concludes that evidence of persistence is weak 
since there is only a 26 per cent probability of repeat top quartile performance. In the UK, 
Brown, Draper and McKenzie (1997) and Blake, Lehmann, & Timmermann, (1999) have 
examined consistency in UK occupational pension fund performance. Both studies find 
only weak evidence of persistence in performance. In constructing their data samples, 
both the Brown et al (1997) and Blake et al (1999) studies of UK pension funds specify 
that the pension fund have the same single fund manager over the length of their 
respective samples. Tonks (2005) argues that this specification of the dataset may have 
induced survivorship bias in these data samples, since Grinblatt and Titman (1992) and 
Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993) have argued that if fund survival depends on 
average performance over several periods, then survivorship induces spurious reversals: 
first-period losers must subsequently win in order to survive, and this biases persistence 
downwards. Tonks (2005) examines persistence in pension fund manager performance 
using data on UK occupational pension funds irrespective of whether they change 
manager. He finds strong evidence of persistence in abnormal returns generated by fund 
managers over one year time horizons. He found that the returns on a zero investment 
portfolio of a long position in a portfolio of fund managers that performed well over the 
previous 12 months and a short position in a portfolio of fund managers that performed 
poorly, would have yielded an annualised abnormal return of 1.56%. He then compares 
his sample with a restricted sample that imposes the Brown et al (1997), and Blake et al 
(1999) criteria that specify that the pension fund has the same fund manager over the 
length of their respective samples. With the restricted sample he finds that the evidence 
on persistence is weaker. Gregory and Tonks (2004) in their study of personal pension 
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funds also examine persistence in performance of these pension schemes and identifies 
negative persistent at short horizons, but at time-intervals of six months to one year finds 
significant positive persistence, though this positive persistence weakens at longer time 
intervals. 
 
8. Conclusions 
This paper has provided a survey of the pension fund management industry and how it relates 
and interacts with individual and occupational private pension funds. We have focused on the 
performance of pension funds whose assets are managed by fund managers. In a funded 
scheme the pension paid to a retired person will depend on the accumulated value of the 
assets in the pension fund at retirement. This is clearly the case for a defined contribution 
scheme where the relationship between the value of the fund and the pension is explicit. But 
this same annuitisation is implicit in a defined benefit scheme, since although there may be 
some risk sharing across generations, ultimately the defined benefit scheme is only able to 
pay out a pension that is a proportion of the value of the assets in the scheme. The value of 
the pension fund will increase over time due to contributions and the investment returns on 
the fund. These investment returns depend on the asset allocation and portfolio decisions of 
fund managers. Small changes in the investment returns compound up to large changes in the 
value of the pension fund at retirement The evidence on fund manager performance is that on 
average they do not add very much value over and above a passive strategy of investing in 
the market index. However this average disguises the fact that some fund managers perform 
well, and others perform poorly. Identifying and understanding the persistence of the poor 
performance of some fund managers is an important issue in the pensions area. 
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Table 1: Private Pension Funding in Major Developed Countries in 1996 
 US $bn % of 
GDP 
Belgium 11 4 
Canada 213 45 
Denmark 38 22 
Finland 18 14 
France 69 5 
Germany 137 6 
Ireland 32 43 
Italy  32 3 
Japan 943 22 
Netherlands 349 89 
Spain 22 4 
Sweden 38 33 
UK 966 76 
US 4763 62 
EU Total 1730 21 
Source: Davis (1998) 
 
Table 2: Assets under Management for eight countries 1999 (Euro billion) 
Country Pension Funds  Insurance 
Companies 
Mutual Funds 
France 66 830 705 
Germany 129 673 515 
Ireland 47 32 150 
Italy 65 169 412 
Netherlands 397 220 83 
Spain 32 62 219 
UK 1270 1266 345 
Total  
Euro-7 
2006 3252 2429 
USA 7225 2403 6388 
Source: Franks, Mayer & da Silva (2003) 
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Table 3: Institutionalisation of the UK Equity Market to 1999. 
 End year (%) 
 1963 1975 1981 1989 1994 1999 
Pension Funds 6.4 16.8 26.7 30.6 27.8 19.6 
Insurance Companies 10.0 15.9 20.5 18.6 21.9 21.6 
Unit & Investment Trusts 
& other 
12.6 14.6 10.4 8.6 10.1 9.7 
Banks 1.3 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.4 1.0 
TOTAL UK Institutions 30.3 48.0 57.9 58.5 60.2 51.9 
Individuals 54.0 37.5 28.2 20.6 20.3 15.3 
Other personal sector 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.3 1.3 1.3 
Public sector 1.5 3.6 3.0 2.0 0.8 0.1 
Industrial & Commercial 
Companies 
5.1 3.0 5.1 3.8 1.1 2.2 
Overseas 7.0 5.6 3.6 12.8 16.3 29.3 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source Myners' Report 2001, from ONS 'Share Ownership: A Report on the Ownership of 
Shares at 31/12/99',  p. 8 
 
 
Table 4: Fund Management fees charged in different countries for a £100 million mandate 
 Basis Points per annum 
 Canada UK Australia US 
 Equities Fixed 
Interest  
Equities Fixed 
Interest  
Equities Fixed 
Interest  
Equities Fixed 
Interest  
Upper Quartile Fee 28 22 48 23 47 22 50 30 
Median Fee 24 18 40 18 44 19 42 26 
Lower Quartile Fee 21 16 30 17 40 18 33 23 
Source: Frank Russell quoted in Myners’ Report (2001) 
 
 
Table 5: Distribution of Managers Across Pension Funds by Category of Manager 
Fman category Overall Between Funds 
Within Funds 
 Freq % Freq. % % 
Multi-manager  17,299 29.07 659 30.3 78.10 
1RMan 6,410 10.77 244 11.22 81.04 
2RMan 3,318 5.58 184 8.46 59.55 
3RMan 2,881 4.84 116 5.33 73.40 
4RMan-
17RMan#
13,758 23.14 681 31.31 68.16 
18RMan-
188RMan 
15,595 26.22 965 44.65 58.84 
ΔMan  248 0.42 225 10.34 2.64 
Total 59,509 100.0 3,074
(n=2,175)
141.33 63.43 
Source: Tonks (2005). Sample consists of 2,175 pension funds 1984-97 with 59,509 quarterly observations, 
with 190 categories of fund manager. Total within = (659*78.1+244*81.04+ ......)/3,074; 'n’RMan denotes ‘n’th 
ranked fund manager by frequency of observations. # denotes that each of these fund managers had greater than 
1% of the overall frequency. 
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 Table 6: Average Annual Returns on Median UK Pension Fund by Asset Class 1994-2003 
 
Median Pension 
Fund Return (%) 
1994-2003 
Index Return 
(%) 1994-2003 Index Definition 
 UK Equities   6.3 6.1 FTSE All-Share 
 Overseas Equities   3.4 5.3 FTSEAll-World Ex-UK 
 UK Gilts  7.1 7 FTSE A All Stocks Gilts 
 Overseas Bonds   4.9 4.7
JP Morgan (Global Ex-UK) 
Traded 
 UK Index-Linked   6.5 6.5 FTSE A ILG 
 Property   11.2 9.8 CAPS Property  
TOTAL FUND 6.1  
Source: RussellMellonCAPS Fund Returns 2004 
 
Table 7: Average Asset Allocation across UK Pension Funds 1993-2003 
As at 31 December 
(%)   1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
            
UK  Equities   57.3    56.0   54.9   54.7   54.3   52.0   53.6    51.0    47.4   43.4   41.5  
Overseas   Equities  24.4    23.0   22.0   21.0   18.6   18.9   22.8    22.5    25.0   25.1   26.7  
UK  Bonds  4.8    6.1   7.4   7.9   9.4   11.3   10.3    12.8    14.8   18.2   19.4  
Overseas  Bonds  4.7    4.6   4.9   3.7   4.0   4.6   3.9    3.7    2.9   2.1   1.1  
Index-Linked  
Bonds   3.0    3.8   3.8   3.9   4.1   4.0   4.0    5.0    5.7   7.1   7.5  
Cash    3.5    3.7   4.6   6.6   7.5   7.2   3.5    3.2    2.3   2.0   1.6  
Property    1.9    2.5   2.1   2.0   1.9   1.9   1.7    1.7    1.8   2.0   2.0  
Other    0.4    0.3   0.3   0.2   0.2   0.1   0.2    0.1    0.1   0.1   0.2  
 TOTAL FUND    100.0   
 
100.0  
 
100.0  
 
100.0  
 
100.0  
 
100.0  
 
100.0   
 
100.0   
 
100.0  
 
100.0  
 
100.0  
Source: RussellMellonCAPS 2004. 
 
 
 
Table 8: Average Asset Allocation of Occupational Pension Funds in Major Markets 2003 
(%) Australia Japan Netherlands Sweden Switzerland UK US Average
 Domestic 
Equities  31 27 7 21 12 39 48 26
 Overseas   
Equities 22 17 36 16 13 28 14 21
 Domestic 
Bonds 17 32 8 29 30 12 33 23
 Overseas  
Bonds 5 13 32 26 16 3 1 14
 Cash   6 5 4 2 10 3 1 4
 Property   12 1 5 6 15 6 2 7
 Other   7 5 8 0 4 9 1 5
 TOTAL 
FUND   100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source UBS Pension Fund Indicators, 2004 
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Table 9: Performance Evaluation of UK Pension Funds 1983-97 
 No. 
Funds 
α α t-stat  δ (Market 
Timing) 
δ t-stat 
Panel A: CAPM benchmark 
Average values 1714 0.00017 0.966  
No. coeffs >0 898  
No. of signif. Coeffs. 165  
Treynor –Mazuy:  
Average Values 1714 0.0008 11.055 -0.0013 -21.152
Merton-Henriksson:  
Average values 1714 0.0018 19.412 -0.0493 -27.14
Panel B: 3-factor benchmark 
Average values  1714 0.0001 4.526  
No. coeffs >0 940  
No. of signif. Coeffs. 142  
Source: Thomas and Tonks (2001) and Tonks (2002) 
Table 10: Performance of UK Personal Pensions 1980-2000 
 No. 
Funds 
α α t-stat  δ (Market 
Timing) 
δ t-stat 
Panel A: CAPM benchmark 
Average values 399 -0.00013 -6.43  
Average Values 399 0.00033 -1.07 -0.1538 -14.12
Panel B: 3-factor benchmark 
Average values  399 0.00029 -1.68  
Average values 399 0.00030 0.68 0.1081 -7.75
Source: Gregory and Tonks (2004) 
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Figure 2: Evidence on performance of pension funds Thomas and Tonks (2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Illustrating the Problem of Market Timing 
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